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Abstract
In this paper we try to locate the essential
components needed for a developmental robot
architecture. We take the vocabulary and the main
concepts from Piaget’s genetic epistemology and
Vygotsky’s activity theory. After proposing an
outline for a general developmental architecture,
we describe the architectures that we have been
developing in the recent years - Petitagé and
Vygovorotsky. According to this outline, various
contemporary works in autonomous agents can be
classified, in an attempt to get a glimpse into the
big picture and make the advances and open
problems visible.
1. Introduction
Recent years have witnessed blossoming of research in
artificial intelligent systems. Recurrent themes were
embodiment, situatedness, symbol grounding, social
situatedness and human-artifact, as well as artifact-artifact
interaction, imitation, analogy, etc. There is a considerable
body of research in physically embodied human like
agents (Cog (Brooks et al. 1999), Infanoid (Kozima
2001), Kismet (Brazeal 2000), Babybot (Metta 2001)).
The overall impression is that most of these works
stressed particular aspect of the artifact behavior without
necessarily having an elaborated theoretical framework.
On the other hand, there are attempts “to put it all
together” (Zlatev 2001), (Prince 2001), (Ziemke 2001), as
well as valuable contemplations about the “big issues in
AI” (Kirsh, 1991), (Bickhard, 1995) which are not
necessarily accompanied by artifacts build around those
considerations. Throughout the text, we use “epigenetic”
and “developmental” as synonyms.
From the beginning, in our work we took Piaget’s
genetic epistemology as departing point in developing our
artifacts. The notions of internal schemas, developmental
stages, hierarchy of abstractions and biological motivation
became central. The general idea is fairly simple: by its
very embodiment, the agent imposes a point of view, a
structure on the incoming sensory flux. Further structure
can be introduced by the way the agent acts in the
environment (a simple example is the sucking: from the
nipple to the thumb, then sucking every toy and then
sucking everything else). Out of this agent-environment
interaction, thus, emerge new structures, which can guide
agent’s future behavior. Those structures can be organized
in various ways, and one of them is to put them in
hierarchies reflecting their abstractness. At the top of this
organization we have the symbols (language in human
agents). Again, they still use the same purpose: to put
organization on the incoming flux of environmental
stimuli. Going up in the hierarchy, the structures become
more detached from the sensors, and are more
manipulable. So the agent ends up by living in this
Umwelt, seeing parts of environment as corresponding to
other agents of its sort, and communicating with them
during the process of socialization. Although the primary
purpose of the language is not the organization of the
environmental stimuli, but social interaction, through
internalization and mediation, the language takes on intra-
psychological functions.
Going up in the hierarchies of abstraction would
correspond to going through the four developmental
stages that Piaget proposed, whose order is invariant:
sensory-motor stage, pre-operational stage, stage of
concrete operations, stage of abstract (logical) operations.
Although, to the last stage we would like to refer as the
stage of socialized linguistic competence. The time frame
of these stages is variable and it will not be discussed
here. What’s important is that their order is invariant.
These four stages roughly correspond to the four types of
meaning systems that Zlatev proposed (Zlatev 2001).
Cue-based meaning corresponds to the inborn reflexes
(inborn schemas). Association-based corresponds to the
sensorimotor stage. Icon-based meaning - corresponds to
the passage from sensory-motor to the pre-operational
stage. Early symbol-based meaning - to the preoperational
stage. While later symbol-based meaning to the stage of
concrete and abstract operations.
Various models that are proposed in the epigenetic
robotics are given at some of the stages, while we believe
that an architecture, which aims to be an instantiation of
cognition and consciousness, should pass through the
process of ontogenesis through all these epigenetic stages.
In the next section, we briefly describe Petitagé and
Vygovorotsky agents, pointing out the key concepts
according to the above discussion. Both agents illustrate
the process of environment internalization. The Petitagé
agent does that by solving the navigation problem, while
the Vygovorotsky agent, although does not include speech
of any kind, includes some forms of social interaction
among several agents of its kind.2. Petitagé
The purpose of our first architecture Petitagé (Stojanov,
1997), (Stojanov, 2001) was to demonstrate the process of
autonomous internalization of the environment. It has a
primitive internal value system which can recognize when
the agent is near an object that can satisfy some of its
drives (e.g. food to satisfy hunger).
Figure 1. Simulation software screen snapshot
The agent is equipped with several sensors and we call
a percept the collection of all sensory readings at a given
moment. The concept of inborn schemas is central during
this process. An inborn schema is simply an ordered n-
tuple of elementary actions that the agent is capable of
performing. Thus, S = ai.ak…am would be an example.
The inborn schema S characterized by its length and the
relative ordering of actions. When in learning mode the
agent tries to execute S. Depending on the environment
structure, only some sub-schemas of the original S will
actually be executed. We call them enabled schemas. For
example (if the agent is capable of performing f-go
forward, l-go left, r-go right) the initial inborn scheme
S=fffllffr will degenerate to Senabled=fffff when the robot is
trying to perform the inborn schema in a corridor. The
map is then built out of the enabled schemas,
complemented with the percepts recorded on the way. In
parallel with map building, there is a process, which looks
for regularities (cycles) in the stream of enabled schemas.
When such cycles are found, entities of higher order are
introduced. If the agent is solving the navigation task,
these higher order entities can be thought of as places
(Figure 2). Now, the agent can have a model of the
environment in terms of these interconnected abstract
entities or places.
FFLRRLFFFabcbdbcdb
FFRLFFFcbdbc
RRLFFFabcbdb
FFLRFFFabdbcdb
FFRRFFFabcbdbb
FFLLFFFcbdbcdb
FFFFFLdbcdb
RRFFFaccdb
FFLRFFabcbdb
FFFFFabddb
Figure 2. Discovering cycles in the sequences of activated
enabled schemas
Petitage architecture resides on the Expectancy Theory
which takes the notion of anticipation to be central for the
cognitive processes, and is largely inspired by Piaget’s
genetic epistemology. More details about the agent can be
found in (Stojanov, 1997), (Stojanov et al. 1997),
(Stojanov, 1999), (Stojanov, 2001)
Several points are worth to be pointed: while acting in
the environment, the agent introduces order in the
incoming sensory input by trying to repeat the actions
dictated by the inborn scheme. The map of enabled
scheme emerges out of the interaction of the inborn
scheme structure, and the environment structure.
Furthermore, the second process of finding regularities in
the stream of enabled schemes provides more abstract and
condensed environment representation. The process can
go further on (finding regularities in the regularities in the
stream of enabled schemas) which would result in a
hierarchy of more and more abstract concepts. These
representations are more detached from the direct sensory
input and would eventually be used as manipulable proto-
symbols in the processes of hypothesis generation (about
unknown environments) or communication with other
same type agents.
We believe that the above mentioned components a)
internal structures which interact with the environment
structure, b) the stages in building the hierarchies and c)
the internal value system, are central for every epigenetic
agent architecture. In the case of the Petitagé agent, we
can relate these stages to the sensory-motor and
beginnings of preoperational stage, as proposed by Piaget
3. Vygovorotsky
We have further developed the architecture of
Petitagé, to include more complex inner value system,
reliability of the schemas as a measurement of fit,
analogy-making as a form of generalization and other
cognitive phenomena such as execution of motor plans
and attention explained in (Kulakov, 1998). The actor’s
knowledge about the environment is represented in a
pseudo-conceptual network whose parts can be activated
at different levels of activation according to a mechanism
for spreading activation, necessary to provide the proper
context relevance for analogy-mapping. The nodes of this
network are formed on the basis of the percepts, while the
links are formed on the basis of the motor actions. Both
nodes and links can be at different levels of abstraction.
Each action schema represents a chain of several simple
actions connecting nodes.
To each schema, a different reliability factor is
assigned, depending on the reliability with which the
expectations of the execution of that schema are met.
Whenever the expectations are not met, the reliability of
that schema is decreased.
The internal drives of the actor are introduced as goal
generators. They are also responsible for grading the
experiences (schemas) according to each drive, giving
them a personal preference for some of the experiences.
Currently three drives are implemented in the model: the
hunger drive, the pain avoidance/pleasure seeking drive
and the curiosity drive.Having a hierarchy of nodes and links, an analogy-
making mechanism is introduced with which some
superficially not-similar nodes can be judged as being
similar by analogy.
3.1 General architecture
The three big blocks in Figure 3, called “Analogical
Memory-Retrieval and Transfer” (AMRAT), “Problem
Selection” and “Behavior”, reflect different functions that
each subsystem has. They share the same knowledge
structures (not depicted here) and hence the arrows
‘target’, ‘plan’ and ‘surprise’ are not some special
messages that are here as interfaces between subsystems,
but rather to give the reader a sense of the processes going
on in our model. These arrows can be seen as the direction
of the flow of activation in the underlying knowledge
structures. The AMRAT part is an analogy-making
subsystem and is responsible for problem-solving, while
having little or no influence from the behavior going on
meanwhile, that is, from the actor’s environment.
Figure 3. General architecture of Vygovorotsky
The problem solving actually takes place after a
successful memory retrieval of an analogous solution (or
episode) has been found (a source domain) and some part
of the knowledge from the source is transferred to the
problem domain (or target). The surprise line functions as
an interrupt to the AMRAT subsystem and then the
information coming from the environment is judged to be
the current ‘problem’ on which the AMRAT subsystem
works, i.e. to find out to which previous episode of actor’s
experience is the current situation analogous to. We can
say that in the “Problem Selection” subsystem, the
environmental information (coming through the ‘sensors’
and ‘actuators’ arrows) competes with the ‘Internal
Drives’ to determine which parts of the pseudo-conceptual
network are the current ‘target’. In that way, the
‘problems’ that are given to the AMRAT part to be
‘solved’ are determined by the current state of the Internal
Drives and by the surprises that happened during the
execution of a certain behavior. The ‘satisfaction’ of these
drives gives the emotional coloring of the knowledge-
structures.
The environment is not depicted as a special block and
should be considered as omnipresent in the figure, from
where the ‘sensors’ come and where the actuators act.
3.2 The knowledge structures
The knowledge structures are organized as a kind of
conceptual network where the nodes are representing
more or less abstract entities derived from the percepts,
while the links in this network are of different kinds, most
significant of them are the action schemas. These kinds of
links are the basis for viewing the conceptual network as a
cognitive map.
Figure 4. One segment of the cognitive map
In Figure 4, a part of the Vygovorotsky’s cognitive
map is depicted. Different shades of gray of the nodes
represent different attributes that are attached to the nodes,
relating them with different ‘needs’ that actors have. The
links between the nodes, depicted as wider or slimmer
blocks, represent different motor schemas that connect the
nodes in the network. In this figure the wideness of the
blocks should represent the reliability of the schema, i.e.
how reliable or confident is a given ‘transition’ between
the nodes. Also, the width of the lines represents the
pattern of activation over the network. There are also
other links between nodes and between motor schemas
(type-token links), which are not shown in this figure.
This type of links connect nodes and links in a hierarchy
of more and more abstract entities. The motor-action
links, no matter how abstract, can be considered as more
or less abstract relations connecting two or more pseudo-
concept nodes (see also (Indurkhya, 1992)).
3.3 Modeled cognitive phenomena
In this section we will give our philosophical and
psychological stance, which we tried to implement in our
Vygovorotsky model. This model follows the sensori-
motor theory of intelligence and the expectancy
framework which are in their essence an interactionist
theories: the knowledge structures present in a cognizer
are a result of the mutual influence that the environment
imposes to the knowledge structures and that these
knowledge structures in turn structure the environment.
Piaget posited mechanisms, assimilation and
accommodation, that mediate the subject’s interaction
with its environment. Assimilation is a process that
reduces the subject’s sensory stimuli to some familiar
concept or category, while accommodation is the process
that causes the subject to modify its cognitive structures in
response to some unexpected stimuli from the
environment, when the existing knowledge structures can
no longer explain satisfactorily the present sensory
stimuli.
Humans are equipped with sensors that make small
generalizations all the time. In the information comingfrom the stimuli that we receive, there are no such things
as objects distributed in a three-dimensional space. Babies
are not born with knowledge what is figure and what is
ground, except for particular stimuli like, faces. Through
repetitive practicing of the learned schemas and repetitive
meetings with certain stimuli, babies build more and more
abstract categories, extracting the common things among
different stimuli, and in that way differentiating between
figure and the ground. (see for e.g. (Drescher, 1991) or
(Mackay, 1952)). This gives the babies a security that they
are acquainted with the world, the need of which is
evolutionary implanted into them. Still, humans and many
animals are capable of making bigger generalizations.
Piaget and Vygotsky only mention that this is done by
analogy-making, while Lakoff and Johnson state this
explicitly (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). We take the stance
as in (French, 1995): “generalizations made between
concepts or relations, differ only in the slippage distance
and refer to different cognitive phenomena such as
recognition, categorization, analogy or metaphor”.
In the beginning the baby’s thinking cannot be
distinguished from its behavior – it is simple and
immediate. The tendency is to learn the environment
better and then less and fewer surprises happen.
3.4. Perception
Today it is widely held that human vision, for instance,
cannot be explained as an entirely “data-driven” or
“bottom-up” process, but needs, at the highest levels, to
be supplemented with expectancy-driven constraints. (see
for example (Schank and Fano, 1995), (Rybak et al.,
1998), (O’Regan and Noë, 2001))
This model wants to integrate this view on perception
with another proposal by Hofstadter and his colleagues
(Hofstadter, 1995) that explains the process of high-level
perception as an analogy-making.
What Vygovorotsky perceives in the moment,
activates some structures in the pseudo-conceptual
network. We call this process metaphorization or
assimilation according to Piaget. That is, whatever is
sensed, seems like the previously built knowledge
structures that the current pattern of activation highlights.
This is the passive assimilation that is done on the basis of
similarity between the current percept and the activated
pseudo-concepts. There is another assimilation of the
current percept – by imposing some action-scheme upon
it. In that sense Vygovorotsky will equate all percepts
upon which it performed that action-scheme.
The similarity between pseudo-concepts is calculated
as in the classical theories about similarity (Tversky and
Gati, 1978) and to this similarity we will refer to as
superficial similarity. Superficial similarity is necessary
during the process of learning when we encounter things
that we have not seen before. The resort upon which we
rely mostly in these cases is the superficial similarity.
Only when we know the structure and relations among
different parts of the concepts, we can judge the similarity
among them in a more profound way – by their structural
similarity. This similarity can be measured by comparing
the relations that hold among various pseudo-concepts
that play role in the comparison – their parts and super-
classes, their related pseudo-concepts (through some
action-schemas), etc. Our approach to this matter is the
combination of the superficial and the structural
comparison between two pseudo-concepts.
3.5. Internal drives as basic motivational
force
We consider emotions as the basic driving forces, or
motivational sources for the behavior, and for the living at
all. Although many of the emotions need cognitive
consideration about them, there are some number of
emotions and bodily needs, cognitively not mediated,
which can be considered as basic, primary source of
motivation.
We have chosen to put three internal drives into
Vygovorotsky, which have evolutionary imposed
counterparts in humans: supply energy (hunger drive),
avoid pain and seek pleasure (affect drive) and explore
(curiosity drive). Evolution has taken care for these
motivational forces to emerge because they are all
connected with the survival of the species: energy supply
and avoidance of pain – to keep the organism from falling
apart; seeking of pleasure for the reproduction cycle; and
epistemic hunger (from the curiosity drive) – because
knowing the environment better, improves the chances of
responding appropriately to the future occasions. We
introduce these three internal drives not because we are
concerned with the survival of Vygovorotsky as a specie,
but because we believe that cognition is essentially
connected with inner values as a primary motivational
force, and that it is necessary to have at least some
internal drives, according to which the subject (actor) will
structure and grade the environment.
The plausibility for providing these three drives can be
found in Piaget’s work. Also the adequacy for the small
number of drives can be inferred from the neuro-
anatomical data, since we only have several basal ganglia:
for hunger and for fill, for hot and cold, for pleasure and
for pain, for thirst, for fear, for affect, etc. Of course there
are more needs for the body, but the main point is that we
must have at least some drives. Basal ganglia are located
in the thalamus where all sensory and motor pathways
intersect. This topology is transferred into the model, in a
way, that all percepts are accompanied by some factors
denoting their desirability. And then, the world shall not
become known, for the actor itself, just by the percepts
and the motor actions in a senseless way. Instead, the
world shall be structured and valued according to the
needs of the agent. Only then, the inputs and the outputs
of the actor can become meaningful to itself – meaningful
for its survival.
We will explain only the third internal drive - the
epistemic hunger (curiosity drive). Its main purpose is to
make the actor explore the non-grounded concepts in the
pseudo-conceptual net. Whenever some new, unexplored,
part of the conceptual network appears, without
connection (or with weakly reliable connections) to any
previously learned or experienced concepts, this nodes
and links in that part of the network are judged as very
desirable according to the epistemic need and a lot ofactivation is sent to this part of the network. When enough
connections between the new and the rest of the nodes are
made, the activation of this drive is raised, thus allowing
more new things to be explored. If the curiosity drive is
low, then practically new things cannot be learned,
because their desirability will be low. Since more
pragmatically useful things are usually more interesting,
the goal nodes (as defined from the other drives) are tried
first. The impact of these drives on the behavior and
reasoning has a hierarchy: if hungry then search for food;
if not hungry then seek pleasure, avoid pain and explore.
In Vygovorotsky every node can potentially be a goal
node – depending on the activity of the three internal
drives and the grades that has each node received
according to the internal needs. So, the goal lists are
changing as the needs change. If the actor is hungry – it
tries to get to the nodes that are marked as very
resourceful with food. The activation that spreads from
these goal nodes to the adjacent nodes depends on their
momentary desirability. The desirability of each node
being part of some action-schema is calculated according
to the following formula:
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Where D is desirability, HD is the value of the Hunger
Drive, HG is the Hunger Grade given to that schema, CD
is the value of the Curiosity Drive, R is the reliability of
that schema and PPG is the Pain/Pleasure Grade of that
schema.
Different combinations of the inborn values (or
maximum – minimum values) for these internal drives,
and different functions F1,F 2 and F3, lead to different
personality profiles of the Vygovorotsky specie: some
actors being greedier, some more hedonistic or durable,
and some more curious than others.
From this desirability value, the granularity of the
node is calculated which will determine the number of
details that will be remembered out of each percept. This
also determines the comparison of percepts and nodes
during the process of abstraction and during the matching
of the percepts with the expectations.
3.6. Building abstract nodes and schemas
If some node becomes an expectation part of an enough
reliable schema, then this node is compared with the
nodes at the basic level of abstractness, and a process tries
to find out the common parts between the nodes. If the
absolute difference between the compared nodes is less
than the determined granularity, then a new abstract node
is added. This abstract node has averaged sensor readings
for those that are common, while the others are left
undefined. Its place in the hierarchy of abstract nodes is
determined, and with type and token links, the new
abstract node is added to the rest of the pseudo-conceptual
network. One example of a hierarchy of nodes is shown in
Figure 5.
There are two mechanisms for building abstract
schemas from the assortment of concrete ones. The first
principle is similar to the process of building abstract
nodes. Namely, whenever some schema is added with
same condition and expectation nodes with another
schema, the sequence of subschemas is compared and
only the overlapping ones are added (in the same order) as
am o r ea b s t r a c ts c h e m a .
Figure 5. A hierarchy of nodes in the pseudo-conceptual network
According to the second principle, for each newly
updated schema with big enough reliability, a search
‘backwards’ from its condition node is done, looking for
the longest reliable chain of schemas. These schemas are
then joined in one super-schema, having them as steps in
the sequence of subschemas. This super-schema is added
with an initial reliability equal to the minimum of the
reliabilities of the subschemas.
3.7. Behavior and expectations
The mind is fundamentally an anticipator, as Dennett
deduced lucidly in his quest for explaining consciousness
and intelligence (Dennett, 1991), (Dennett, 1996). In
every moment, in every step we anticipate something and
then we expect the outcome of our actions. Wherever we
have been before, the next times we go there we expect
things to be just as they were. By learning the
environment in a manner of connecting the current
percept with some motor schema and some expectation
for the next percept and so on, Vygovorotsky actor
structures the environment according to its possibilities to
perceive, to act and to sense. In that way it builds an
expectation framework for the environment where it lives.
So whenever the expectations are met, the actor does not
have to bother what will do next – it does that on “auto-
pilot”. The problem appears when it is surprised (as
fortunately often happens in a dynamic environment).
It is not the case that we always have expectations for
every detail that we are going to perceive in the near
future. We build abstract expectations in which only some
parts, which we claim to be relevant for the situation, are
represented. These kinds of expectations are built during
the process of decontextualization, i.e. during practicing
them in many different contexts. If some part of the newly
built expectations is repeated in several of them, then that
part of the expectations will be extracted as an abstract
expectation of that particular action.
3.8. Where does Vygovorotsky fit
We can relate the processes going on in the
Vygovorotsky agent as belonging to the first two stages
according to Piaget: sensory-motor and pre-operational.Although imitation is in its essence an analogy-
making, the process that happens in Vygovorotsky agent
is an analogy-making between two parts of its internal
knowledge structures, not between itself and some other
agent. We have built several agents in the environment
(Figure 6), one of them controlled by a human (and called
‘The Mother”), but have not put some inborn mechanisms
for analogy-making between their body parts. That is left
for future work.
Figure 6. One room of the Vygovorotsky’s environment,
together with its current sensor readings on the right
The interaction between ‘The Mother” and the
Vygovorotsky agent is intensified by causing pleasure by
touching. Also “The Mother” can grab the Vygovorotsky
agent and bring it near food. So later when Vygovorotsky
agent becomes hungry, it goes toward its mother,
expecting that it will help reducing the hunger. In any
time, Vygovorotsky agent tries to be near its mother as a
source for joy. We consider this as an origin for a more
complex social interaction.
This model, among other things, provides a
psychologically plausible way of building conceptual
networks used in many models of analogy-making,
supplementing and unifying them with behavior. The
knowledge structures are constructed in the course of
actor’s behavior and in that way they are grounded in its
experience.
Although the name Vygovorotsky implies that the
agent should be linguistically competent, that is our goal
and is left for future work.
4. Conclusions
All work done in epigenetic robotics fits into some of the
developmental stages according to Piaget. These stages
roughly correspond to the meaning system proposed by
Zlatev. A cognitive architecture should pass through all
these stages during the process of its ontogenesis. The
structures should begin from simple immediate schemas
built from sensory readings and motor actions, through the
process of abstraction and analogy-making to more
complex cognitive structures such as conceptual maps
including emotional system, plans for acting and language
system. These structures should be graded according to
the inner value system in order for the agents to be truly
autonomous.
Two similar architectures, Petitagé and Vygovorotsky,
are presented which work in the sensori-motor and pre-
operational stage of development. They both have inner
value system and build abstraction hierarchies and
relations among the knowledge structures. Vygovorotsky
uses analogy-making as a higher form of manipulating
with the knowledge structures and has a potential to
advance into the third stage of concrete operations.
Although the name is Vygovorotsky, it actually reflects
the directions for our future work, namely to have a
linguistically competent agents.
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